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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE; STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintiffTPetitioner, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, Case No. 20010809-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001) grants jurisdiction. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the judge erred in 
sentencing Wanosik in absentia where the trial judge presumed that Wanosik's absence 
was knowing and voluntary when Wanosik did not appear at sentencing? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for correctness. State v. Lavman. 1999 UT 79, ^|3, 985 P.2d 911 (further 
citations omitted). This issue presents a legal question which was reviewed below for 
correctness. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,1J8, 31 P.3d 615. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Respondent's sentence 
must be vacated based on a violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process where 
the sentencing judge imposed the statutory maximum sentence without affording counsel 
the opportunity to make a statement regarding information relevant to sentencing and 
without basing the sentence on reliable and relevant information? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness. Layman, 1999 UT79, f3 (further citations omitted). This issue was 
reviewed below for correctness. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, [^9. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, is in Addendum A. 
TEXT OF PERTINENT RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rule and constitutional provisions is in addendum B: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Article I, sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution; 
Due Process Clause, Amend. XIV, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Respondent Anthony Wanosik ("Respondent" or "Wanosik") pled 
guilty before Third District Court Judge Judith S. Atherton to class A and B 
misdemeanors for attempted and actual possession of a controlled substance. R. 18-24, 
27-28, 53. Judge Atherton set sentencing for May 26, 2001 before Third District Judge 
J. Dennis Frederick and directed Wanosik to go to Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") 
for preparation of a presentence report ("PSR"). R. 28. When Wanosik did not appear at 
sentencing, Judge Frederick sentenced him in absentia to the statutory maximum on each 
count. R. 54:3.1 
1
 The judge in this case was the only Third District Court judge who routinely 
sentenced defendants in absentia when they did not appear at sentencing. This 
sentencing judge sentenced a number of criminal defendants to the statutory maximum 
2 
The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded the case for 
resentencing because Judge Frederick imposed sentence without affording defense 
counsel the opportunity to address information relevant to sentencing and without relying 
on relevant and reliable information, in violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due 
process. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ffi[28-36. The C o u r t of Appeals also held that the 
judge erred in sentencing Wanosik in absentia because the judge had improperly 
analyzed whether the absence was voluntary; the error in sentencing Wanosik in absentia 
was harmless, according to the Court of Appeals, because while being held in jail on the 
sentence in this case, Wanosik sent a letter to the judge stating that he did not have a 
legitimate excuse for not appearing at sentencing. Id., fflf 19-26. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wanosik was apprehended after a police officer saw him rummage through 
donated items which had been left at a Deseret Industries store and place something in 
his pocket. R. 6. During a subsequent search, officers found the items which led to the 
charges in this case. R. 6-7. After pleading guilty to a class A and a class B 
under almost identical circumstances where the judge simply imposed the maximum 
sentence without affording counsel the opportunity to speak and without otherwise 
basing the sentence on reliable and relevant information. A number of those cases were 
before the Court of Appeals when the decision in this case was issued. See e.g. State v. 
Gardner. 2001 UT App 335; State v. Samora. 2001 UT App 266; State v. Rogers. Case 
No. 20000812-CA; State v. Vicente. 2002 UT App 43; State v. Bird. 2001 UT App 333; 
State v. Wheeler. 2001 UT App 276; State v. Pavne. 2001 UT App 242. Wanosik was 
the lead case and is the only case in which the Court of Appeals issued a published 
opinion. 
3 
misdemeanor, Wanosik went to AP&P for preparation of a presentence report. R. 52. 
AP&P recommended that Wanosik serve twenty days in jail with credit for time served, 
followed by substance abuse treatment. R. 52:11. 
On May 26, 2000, Wanosik did not appear at sentencing. R. 29-30, 54; see 
transcript in Addendum C. Defense counsel told the judge that Wanosik had appeared 
for his PSR and received a favorable report, and that she expected him to be at the 
sentencing hearing. R. 54:1. Defense counsel also told the judge that she thought 
Wanosik might have written the wrong date down, and asked for the opportunity to find 
him. R. 54:1. Without affording either party the opportunity to address factors relevant 
to sentencing and without referring to the PSR or following its recommendations, the 
judge concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent and sentenced Wanosik in absentia 
to a concurrent maximum sentence for each misdemeanor. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL2 ]: Your Honor, my last matter before you is Anthony 
James Wanosik, and I've looked for him but I've not been able to find him, your 
Honor. He did obtain his pre-sentence report. 
THE COURT: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom? 
(No response) 
THE COURT: Yes, let's discuss that matter for a moment. This is case No. 
CR00-5943. Ms. Garland, you're appearing in his behalf? 
2
 The transcript shows that the trial court made this statement. Read in context, 
however, it appears that defense counsel was actually speaking. R. 54:2. 
4 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am, your Honor. I think given that he did go and obtain 
his pre-sentence report he was intending to show up today, and so I would ask that 
you hold on to any warrants and give me a chance to find him. I believe he may 
have simply written down the wrong date. 
THE COURT: Well 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe that, Judge, because this is a fairly favorable 
pre-sentence report, so he would have had no reason to try and avoid court today, 
it would - -
THE COURT: Presumably. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, it would have been in his best interest to appear. 
THE COURT: I think in the meantime, counsel, given his failure to appear I will 
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for his arrest returnable forthwith no 
bail. My inclination is to sentence him today, and I recognize you would prefer 
that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has failed to appear 
today, although I can only assume because he has not been in touch with you nor 
has he been in touch with my court that he has chosen to voluntarily absent 
himself from these proceedings. 
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this Court that he serve 
the term provided by law in the adult detention center of one year for the class A 
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of a controlled sentence, and six 
months for the possession of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor charge to 
which he pled guilty. I will order that those terms be served concurrently and not 
consecutively, and that they be imposed forthwith. 
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or shows up before he's 
arrested, then you may approach me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'alesandro, you 
prepare the findings of fact conclusions of law and order determining voluntary 
absent compliance, and that will be the order. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I would object to that order because I don't think 
that it takes into account his due process rights or his rights about - -
THE COURT: Right. 
5 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: However, I realize that's your order. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant him credit for the eight days he 
served originally awaiting imposition or a resolution. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Ms. Garland. 
R. 542-4. 
Wanosik was booked on this case on October 4,2000. R. 56. On October 10, 
2000, Wanosik sent a letter to Judge Frederick, asking for release and indicating that he 
did not have a "legitimate excuse" for missing court. R. 66.3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred in sentencing 
Wanosik in absentia. As the Court of Appeals concluded, the trial court erred in 
assuming that Wanosik's absence from sentencing was voluntary when Wanosik did not 
appear at sentencing. Additionally, Wanosik's absence was not a knowing waiver of his 
right to presence where the record does not demonstrate that he knew the sentencing 
would proceed without him if he did not appear. Moreover, this Court should adopt a 
balancing test which requires trial courts to balance the public's interest in proceeding in 
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present before permitting trial courts to 
proceed in absentia. Such a balancing of interests would protect the integrity of the 
3
 Wanosik was released from the jail in June 2001. He served the entire sentence 
in this case, with credit for good time. 
6 
system, the dignity of individual defendants, and the right to presence by ensuring that 
sentencing in absentia occurs only in those cases where the public interest in proceeding 
requires that the sentencing be held without the defendant. 
The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that the sentence in this case must 
be vacated because it was imposed in violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due 
process. The plain language of rule 22(a) requires a sentencing judge to afford the 
parties an opportunity to speak at sentencing. Because the defendant has the right to 
counsel at sentencing and because the rule read as a whole contemplates input from both 
parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that rule 22(a) requires the trial judge 
to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing. 
The Court of Appeals correctly reviewed this issue under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
This Court should refuse to review the state's claim that a rule 22(e) review was not the 
correct procedure because this issue was not raised in the state's petition for writ of 
certiorari and is not fairly included in the issues which were raised. Even if the issue is 
reviewed, it should be rejected because the state's claim is incorrect. An illegal sentence 
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner can be reviewed for the first time on appeal. 
The only circumstances under which this Court has rejected rule 22(e) review is when the 
defendant is attacking the conviction rather than the sentence. In this case where 
Wanosik was attacking his illegal sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner, the 
issue could be reviewed on appeal pursuant to rule 22(e). 
7 
The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that the trial court violated due 
process in failing to base the sentence on relevant and reliable information. The judge 
failed to conduct a full and fair sentencing or to consider pertinent factors. The record 
reveals that the only factor considered by the court in imposing the maximum sentence 
was Wanosik's absence whereas numerous factors supported probation. Because the 
sentence was not based on relevant and reliable information, it was properly vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SENTENCING RESPONDENT IN ABSENTIA. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to presence at all critical proceedings. Sentencing is a critical stage of the 
proceedings at which a defendant has the right to be present unless he knowingly and 
voluntarily waives that right. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah 
1996); State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
The Court of Appeals correctly held in this case that the state had not sustained its 
burden of establishing that Wanosik's absence from sentencing was voluntary. Wanosik, 
2001 UT App 241, TP9-25. In reaching that decision, the lower court relied on the right 
to presence, case law from Utah appellate courts, and the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^|19-25. The trial court also erred in sentencing 
Wanosik in absentia because Wanosik did not knowingly waive his right to presence. 
Additionally, because the public interest in proceeding with the sentencing in absentia 
8 
did not outweigh Wanosik's interest in being present, the trial court erred in sentencing 
Wanosik in absentia. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THAT WANOSIK'S ABSENCE 
WAS VOLUNTARY. 
1. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Based on Precedent. 
As is the case with waiver of any constitutional right, a voluntary waiver of the 
right to presence cannot be presumed. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. The burden is on the 
state to establish voluntariness. State v. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989). 
Relying on Houtz and Anderson, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in this 
case that "'voluntariness may not be presumed by the trial court.'" Wanosik. 2001 UT 
App 241, lf21 (quoting Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678). In fact, "the constitutional right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime 
which may not be infringed or frittered away." State v. Aikers. 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah 1935). Given the fundamental and "sacred" nature of this right, the presumption 
against waiver is strong. State v. Okumura. 570 P.2d 848, 852 (Haw. 1977) (cited 
favorably in Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678). This strong presumption against waiver is 
consistent not only with Houtz. but also with the cases cited in Houtz. and the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
Houtz demonstrates that the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence could not be 
presumed when he did not appear. In Houtz. when the defendant did not appear at trial, 
9 
the judge continued the case until the next day. When the defendant again did not 
appear, the prosecutor told the court that Houtz had been arrested for drunk driving two 
days earlier in California. Rather than continuing the trial, the trial court "determined 
that defendant had voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the trial because he had left 
Utah in violation of his bail." Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. This Court rejected that 
conclusion, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial because the trial court 
"made inadequate inquiry into defendant's ability to appear [at trial]." IdL. 
Like Wanosik, Houtz did not appear and apparently was not in contact with his 
lawyer. Moreover, Houtz had left the state in violation of his bail whereas there is 
nothing in the record suggesting Wanosik had left the state. Just as the judge did not 
make "adequate inquiry into [Houtz's] ability to appear" (id.), the judge in this case did 
not make adequate inquiry into Wanosik's ability to appear. Without more, Wanosik's 
nonappearance was not sufficient to establish a voluntary waiver of his right to presence. 
The decision in Wanosik that the trial judge cannot presume voluntariness but 
instead must make "an inquiry into defendant's ability to appear" (Wanosik. 2001 UT 
App 241, |^21(citing Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678)) is also consistent with this Court's decision 
in Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107. This Court concluded, however, that Anderson had 
voluntarily waived his right to presence at sentencing where (1) he agreed in writing and 
orally that he would be tried in absentia if he failed to appear at trial; and (2) after not 
appearing at trial and being convicted in absentia pursuant to his waiver, Anderson did 
10 
not appear at sentencing. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110-12. 
Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, this Court reasoned in Anderson that 
since Anderson had not challenged the propriety of the trial in absentia and the trial in 
absentia was properly conducted pursuant to Anderson's knowing and voluntary waiver 
of his right to presence, it necessarily followed that the trial court could sentence 
Anderson in absentia and that it would be anomalous to preclude sentencing in absentia 
under such circumstances. Id. at 1110 (citing Brewery. Raines. 670 F.2d 117, 119 (9th 
Cir. 1982)) ("To hold that the Constitution permits a person to be tried and convicted 
while voluntarily absent, and yet, somehow, precludes the sentencing in absentia of the 
same person would be, at the least, anomalous.11). The decision in Anderson did not 
undercut Houtz or the requirement that voluntariness cannot be presumed and must 
instead be established by the state. Instead, Anderson held that in cases where a 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to presence at trial, the court can 
thereafter sentence in absentia such a defendant who does not appear at sentencing. 
The state is incorrect when it argues that this Court held in Anderson that "once 
the State had met its burden to show that Anderson had notice, the burden shifted to 
Anderson to present some reason for his absence." State's brief at 9. The Court in 
Anderson did not discuss burden shifting. Instead, it focused on the fact that Anderson 
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence at trial and held that 
sentencing in absentia was also appropriate when the defendant, who had not maintained 
11 
contact with his attorney, failed to appear at sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110-
1111. Contrary to the state's argument, Anderson does not address the issue raised in 
this case as to whether a defendant who has appeared throughout the proceedings, but 
fails to appear at sentencing, can be sentenced in absentia based on his nonappearance. 
In Anderson, this Court cited Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987 for the proposition that 
M[a]ny waiver of the right to be present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.'" Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (quoting Wagstaff, 772 
P.2d at 990). Wagstaff also mandates that "[t]he state carries the burden of showing 
voluntariness." Id (citing State v. Ross. 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982 (per curiam)). 
Additionally, Wagstaff reiterates that the totality of the circumstances are considered in 
determining whether a defendant waived his right to presence. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d at 
990. 
Beyond these general propositions, Wagstaff provides little guidance for the issue 
before this Court because that case was in a different procedural posture and involved a 
distinct factual situation. After being tried in absentia, Wagstaff filed a motion to arrest 
judgment with accompanying affidavits outlining his reasons for missing the trial. The 
lower court concluded that Wagstaff s absence was voluntary under the circumstances 
outlined by Wagstaff and refused to vacate its previous order that Wagstaff waived his 
right to presence. Id, Because the trial court reaffirmed its conclusion that the absence 
was voluntary based on the totality of circumstances outlined in the affidavits filed as 
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part of the motion to arrest judgment, Wagstaff is not instructive as to whether 
nonappearance at sentencing is sufficient to establish a voluntary waiver. 
State v. Mvers. 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973) is consistent with Wanosik. With little 
analysis, this Court concluded that Myers waived his right to presence when he failed to 
return for the second day of trial. Myers, 508 P.2d at 42-43. Crosby v. United States. 
506 U.S. 255, 258-61 (1993) recognizes that a person who fails to appear after a trial has 
commenced knows that the trial will proceed without him, and knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his right to presence. Whereas a defendant who does not appear on 
the first day of trial would not know that the trial would go on without him, a mid-trial 
flight demonstrates a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence. Under the 
totality of circumstances in Myers, where the trial was underway when the defendant 
failed to return for the second day of trial, Myers waived his right to presence. 
Despite the repeated mandate that the right to presence is a sacred one, that there 
is a presumption against waiver of that right, and that the state has the burden of 
establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived that right in order to 
proceed in absentia, the state argues that any determination as to whether the defendant 
waived his right to presence must be made under some sort of burden shifting analysis. 
State's brief at 7-11. Utah case law does not support the state's burden shifting 
argument. Instead, Utah case law repeatedly clarifies that there is a strong presumption 
against waiver of this important right and that the state must establish the knowing and 
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voluntary character of any waiver of the right to presence. 
The twenty-year-old cases cited by the state in support of its burden shifting 
analysis are not compelling. See Petitioner's brief at 9, citing United States v. Marotta. 
518 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. App. 1981); 
Moore v. State . 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). All three cases involve 
circumstances where the defendant fled mid-trial. As Crosby and Taylor v. United 
States. 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) recognize, it is reasonable to conclude when a defendant 
flees mid-trial that the defendant knew the trial would go on without him and chose not 
to attend. All three courts conducted a totality of the circumstances review. See e.g. 
Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298; Moore. 670 S.W.2d at 261. Counsel's failure to locate 
Moore after contacting hospitals was a significant additional circumstance supporting the 
court's conclusion that Moore knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence. 
Id. Efforts by law enforcement to locate Cotton after he failed to appear mid-trial were 
likewise significant in supporting the waiver in that case. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298. 
While Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298 does state that there is a presumption of 
voluntariness when a defendant does not appear, such a presumption is contrary to case 
law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, because the totality 
of circumstances in Cotton demonstrated voluntariness, the presumption shifting 
language was not necessary to the conclusion. 
Moore recognizes that the defendant could have put on evidence at a motion for 
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new trial which would refute the voluntariness conclusion made at the time the trial court 
proceeded in absentia. Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 261. Such a recognition does not shift the 
burden of establishing voluntariness. Instead, in cases where the totality of the 
circumstances demonstrated a constitutional waiver and the court proceeded in absentia, 
the defendant can later ask the court to reconsider based on additional information made 
known to the court at a motion for new trial or to arrest judgment. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals outlined some things that the state might do 
to establish a voluntary absence. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, [^23. These possible 
inquiries provide suggestions as to "avenues for establishing voluntariness," but are not 
mandatory. Id. Instead, the possible suggested inquiries include information which, 
under a totality of circumstances test, might tip the analysis in favor of a voluntariness 
determination. The suggested possible avenues for establishing voluntariness include: 
(1) finding out whether the defendant is incarcerated; (2) checking local hospitals; (3) 
checking with defendant's employer; (4) checking defendant's residence or other contact 
numbers; (5) checking with Pre-Trial Services; or (6) checking with the bail bond 
company or person who posted bond. Id. 
The state takes issue with this outline of possible inquiries it might make in order 
to establish that a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to presence, arguing that the 
approach is "aberrational" and no other jurisdiction "mandate[s] extensive investigational 
inquiries like those that the court of appeals' opinion requires to rebut a presumption of 
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involuntariness.M State's brief at 11. The state's criticism is easily dispensed with, 
however, because Wanosik does not mandate that all of the inquiries listed be made. 
Instead, Wanosik provides the list as a practical suggestion to prosecutors who hope to 
proceed with a sentencing in absentia when a defendant does not appear. 
Additionally, the list of possible inquiries is based on a review of case law and the 
circumstances which affect the determination of whether an absence is voluntary as well 
as common sense. For example, Houtz indicated that a defendant's incarceration is a 
factor that weighs against a conclusion that the absence was voluntary. 714 P.2d at 678. 
Moore indicates that a defendant's hospitalization weighs against a determination that the 
absence is voluntary. 670 S.W.2d at 261. The unsuccessful efforts made to locate a 
defendant are also factors that courts consider and rely on in concluding that the absence 
is voluntary. See e,g. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298. Checking with Pre-Trial Services, the 
bail bond company, defendant's employer, and any contact numbers is simply a common 
sense approach to attempting to locate the defendant; failure to locate the defendant after 
such inquiries are made may support a determination that the absence is voluntary. 
Given the strong presumption against waiver of the right to presence, the Court of 
Appeals' suggestions are not aberrant and instead indicate some circumstances that might 
demonstrate waiver. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is based on Houtz. Anderson, and other precedent 
which establish that there is a strong presumption against waiver and that the state has 
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the burden of overcoming that presumption and establishing that the defendant 
voluntarily waived his right to presence if the state wishes to proceed with a sentencing 
in absentia. Additionally, the Court of Appeals' decision properly incorporates the 
totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a defendant has voluntarily 
waived his right to presence. Pursuant to controlling case law, the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the trial court erred in assuming that Wanosik's absence 
established that he voluntarily waived his right to presence. 
2. Policy Considerations Support the Court of Appeals' Conclusion that the Trial 
Court Incorrectly Presumed that the Absence Was Voluntary. 
The critical importance of the right to presence at sentencing supports the Court of 
Appeals' reliance on the strong presumption against waiver of that right as well as the 
court's suggestions as to factors which might overcome that presumption. f,[T]he 
common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present at his sentencing." 
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. No. Cal. 1982); see also United States 
v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Presence is of critical 
importance at sentencing not only because it allows judges to be presented with all 
information necessary for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge 
to question and admonish the defendant. "It is only when the defendant is before the 
court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 
208, 209 (Ariz. 1983). 
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Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other rights, 
such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating evidence, and it 
may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker be required to face him. 
The state may have an interest in the presence of the defendant in order that the 
example of personal admonition might deter others from similar crimes. 
Moreover, it may sometimes be important that the convicted man be called to 
account publicly for what he has done, not to be made an instrument of the general 
deterrent, but to acknowledge symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts 
and to receive personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the 
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915 (citation omitted). 
A defendant's absence at sentencing does not carry the same potential for 
"immobilizing] or frustrating] the justice system" as the defendant's absence at trial 
carries. Id When trials are continued indefinitely because of an absent defendant, 
witnesses may be lost and evidence may be compromised, making it difficult to obtain a 
conviction. After a defendant has been convicted, however, such danger "has largely 
although not entirely disappeared." Id. The conviction is in place and all that remains is 
sentencing the defendant when he is located. The minimal risk associated with delay of 
an appeal or possible retrial caused by postponing sentencing until a defendant is located 
is far outweighed by the importance of a defendant's presence at sentencing. Id.4 
4
 The possible collateral consequences claimed by the state in footnote 5 of its 
brief at 14 do not outweigh the critical importance of the right to presence at sentencing. 
Moreover, neither example of a collateral consequence of the Wanosik decision pans out 
when scrutinized. For example, a judge can always order appropriate conditions for 
pretrial release. This means that a judge can order that person charged with a crime not 
possess weapons while out of jail on pretrial release. A conviction is not necessary. 
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In addition, presence at sentencing preserves the dignity of the individuals being 
sentenced as well as the integrity of the system itself. 
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man to be 
present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce whether it 
will deprive him of life or how and to what extent it will deprive him of his 
liberty. It shows a lack of fundamental respect for the dignity of a man to 
sentence him in absentia. The presence of the defendant indicates that society has 
sufficient confidence in the justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the 
convicted man himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability 
of both sentence and conviction. 
Id at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Recognizing the importance of presence at sentencing and enforcing the 
presumption against waiver of that right does not create an unworkable situation. 
Wanosik does not say that defendants cannot be sentenced in absentia. Instead, it simply 
reaffirms that the state must establish under the totality of the circumstances that an 
absence was voluntary and the trial court cannot simply assume that because a defendant 
is not present for sentencing, he has voluntarily waived his right to presence. 
While the state is correct that many defendants fail to appear at sentencing, this is 
the only Third District judge who routinely sentenced such people in absentia. In light 
Moreover, sentencing a defendant in absentia and ordering that he not possess weapons 
has little practical effect since the defendant is not present for the order. As far as the 
state's second example, if a defendant is present and testifying so as to allow for 
impeachment under rule 609, he will also have been picked up for the warrant for failing 
to appear for sentencing. This means that by the time any trial was held where the prior 
could be used for impeachment, sentencing would have occurred in the case where the 
defendant failed to appear at sentencing. 
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of the fact that a significant number of judges do not ordinarily sentence defendants in 
absentia and the system has not been thwarted or rendered impotent, it is safe to assume 
that the Court of Appeals' adherence to the presumption against waiver will not have the 
devastating effects suggested by the state. See state's brief at 12-14. 
Moreover, this is not a case where the defendant disappeared for a long time and 
otherwise threatened the orderly administration of justice. Wanosik's pretrial sheet, 
which was available to the trial judge had he been inclined to look, listed Wanosik's 
home address. R. 8. Wanosik had lived in the area for 50 years and with his wife, 
Pamela, for eighteen years. R. 8. He had three children, two of whom he was 
supporting. R. 8. He had the same employer for a year and listed the employer's phone 
number. R. 8. Had the trial judge continued sentencing to allow the parties to attempt to 
locate Wanosik, he almost certainly would have been located and brought to court. In 
fact, Wanosik was booked on the warrant shortly after the absentia sentencing. R. 56, 
69. The state's overanxious concerns about the wheels of justice grinding to a halt if 
courts are not allowed to sentence in absentia those defendants who do not appear at 
sentencing simply do not apply to this case or any case where the defendant does not 
appear at the first scheduled sentencing hearing and no effort is made to locate him. 
As a final matter, the state argues that there are adequate remedies available for 
people who are sentenced in absentia where it later turns out that the absence was not 
voluntary. State's brief at 14. According to the state, the defendant can either request a 
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review with the trial court or appeal the sentence.5 Wanosik did both and nevertheless 
served the entire sentence even though the presentence report recommended twenty days. 
These were empty remedies for Wanosik and any other defendant in similar 
circumstances because any review of the sentence is conducted by the same judge who 
sentenced the defendant in absentia; that judge can deny a review hearing. Additionally, 
because the appellate process takes a long time, misdemeanor sentences are generally 
served before the appeal is resolved, as was the case here. 
The Court of Appeals followed existing case law, recognized the importance of 
the right to presence, and provided a workable approach for cases in which a defendant 
fails to appear at sentencing. In cases where the state is adamant about proceeding with 
the sentencing, the state will make the appropriate inquiry, as it has done in a significant 
number of cases since the Wanosik decision was issued. Precluding sentencing courts 
from presuming voluntariness based solely on the defendant's absence helps preserve the 
sacredness of the right to presence, the integrity of the system, the dignity of the 
individual defendant, and the protections required by due process at sentencing. 
B. WANOSIK DID NOT KNOWINGLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO PRESENCE. 
As is the case with voluntariness, the state was required to establish that Wanosik 
knowingly waived his right to presence at sentencing. The presumption against waiver 
5
 The state also suggests that a defendant could file a post-conviction writ. That 
was not true for Wanosik, whose appeal was pending when he was arrested. 
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applies with equal force to the knowledge aspect of the waiver test. 
In order to knowingly waive the right to presence, the record must establish not 
only that Wanosik knew the date of his sentencing hearing, but also that he knew the 
sentencing would proceed even if he were not present. See. United States v. McPherson. 
421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (recognizing that in order for a waiver to be 
knowing, record must establish not only that defendant knew of his right to be present, 
but also that defendant knew that trial would proceed if he were not there). While 
knowledge that the trial will commence if the defendant is not present cannot be imputed 
to the defendant who does not appear at the start of his trial (see. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 
261), a defendant who flees mid-trial is likely to know that the trial will go on without 
him. Id at 261. The Crosby Court stated: 
"Since the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock 
most lawyers, it would hardly be appropriate to impute knowledge that this will 
occur to their clients.'1 Starkey, Trial in Absentia, 54 N.Y. St. 262 B.J. 30, 34 
n. 28 (1982). It is unlikely, on the other hand, "'that a defendant who flees from a 
courtroom in the midst of a trial - - where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are 
present and ready to continue - - would not know that as a consequence the trial 
could continue in his absence.'" Tavlor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct. 
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) [further citation omitted]. 
Id 
Just as knowledge that a trial will commence in the defendant's absence cannot be 
imputed to a defendant, knowledge that a judge will sentence a defendant if the 
defendant is not present cannot be imputed to a defendant. Because any sentence 
imposed by a judge needs to be carried out, it seems likely that defendants would assume 
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that they need to be present in order for the sentencing to proceed. Moreover, due to the 
critical importance of presence to sentencing, several jurisdictions refuse to allow 
sentencing in absentia unless there are extraordinary circumstances. Fettis. 664 P.2d at 
209. 
Extraordinary circumstances which would allow for sentencing in absentia, while 
"rare indeed" (idL), include circumstances where the defendant expressly waived his right 
to be present at sentencing. Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citing United States v. Brown. 
456 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972V cert, denied. 415 U.S. 960 (1974)). Extraordinary 
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the 
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does 
not appear. See Lowerv v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 1988) (court is "unwilling 
to hold that the fundamental right to be present at sentencing was knowingly waived in 
the absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being 
sentenced prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link. 685 N.E.2d 624, 
626 (111. App. 1997) (in order to try or sentence defendant in absentia, state must 
establish defendant had knowledge of the date of the proceeding and was warned that the 
proceedings could go on without him if he did not appear); People v. Bennett . 557 
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (sentencing in absentia upheld where 
defendant was fully advised of the consequences of failing to appear and agreed to being 
sentenced in absentia if he intentionally failed to appear). 
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Requiring that a defendant be informed that the sentencing will proceed in his 
absence in order to find a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is 
consistent with this Court's decision in Anderson. Anderson was warned of the 
consequences of failing to appear and signed a written waiver of his right to presence if 
he did not appear. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. This Court's holding in Anderson that 
the right to presence was knowingly and voluntarily waived fits squarely with a 
requirement that the defendant must be informed that the proceedings will go on without 
him in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to presence. 
Moreover, in Anderson, this Court explicitly relied on McPherson. stating, ,f[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings. United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969)." 
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Since the notice required in McPherson was notice that the 
hearing would proceed even if the defendant was not present, and Anderson had notice 
that the proceedings would continue without him if he did not appear, the reliance on 
McPherson appears to require that a defendant be given notice that the hearing will 
proceed in his absence in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to presence. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the requirement that a defendant be given notice of 
the consequences of his nonappearance, and instead held that a waiver is knowing if the 
defendant is given notice of the date and time of the hearing. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 
241, Tf 11 -16. The lower court thought that requiring notice of the consequences of 
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nonappearance would allow defendants to impede the orderly administration of justice by 
failing to appear. IdL, fl2. This reasoning ignores the likelihood that without such 
notice, a defendant would not know that sentencing was to proceed without him and the 
fact that in most cases, the administration of justice is not significantly delayed because 
most defendants who fail to appear are picked up on a warrant shortly thereafter. 
Additionally, any risk of impeding the orderly administration of justice by not 
proceeding in absentia at sentencing is minimal because the conviction has already been 
secured and any sentence imposed in absentia cannot be carried out until the defendant is 
back before the court. Regardless of whether the absent defendant is sentenced, a bench 
warrant will be issued and the defendant will be subject to being picked up and jailed. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the requirement that the defendant know of the 
consequences of his failure to appear because, according to the court, M[t]he United 
States Supreme Court has . . . explicitly rejected McPherson's holding requiring such a 
warning. See Taylor. 414 U.S. at 20 n.3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n.3 ('[T]he Court of 
Appeals . . . disagreed with McPherson, and, in our view, rightly so.'" Wanosik, 2001 
UT App 241, ^fl3. While Taylor did reject the holding in McPherson that a defendant 
who flees mid-trial must be warned of the consequences of his absence in order for there 
to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence, Taylor did not reject the 
more general concept in McPherson that for there to be a knowing waiver of the right to 
presence, the defendant must know that the proceeding will go forward in his absence. 
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As the United States Supreme Court explained, a defendant who flees mid-trial after a 
jury has been selected and where witnesses and lawyers are present knows that the trial 
will proceed even if he is not there. Crosby. 505 U.S. at 261-62. McPherson therefore 
acted knowingly when he absented himself mid-trial and notice that the trial would 
proceed without him was not necessary under those circumstances. This Court's citation 
in McPherson for the proposition that any waiver of the right to be present must be 
knowing, despite the language in Taylor, demonstrates that the McPherson requirement 
that the defendant must know the consequences of the nonappearance in order to waive 
the right to presence has continuing vitality after Taylor. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the distinction in Crosby between mid-trial 
and pretrial flight by reasoning that the language of Fed. R. Crim. 23 makes that 
distinction and therefore the Crosby distinction is based on the federal rules and not 
constitutional concerns. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, [^14-15. While Crosby was 
decided based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the concern in Crosby that 
defendants who do not appear at the commencement of trial-or sentencing-do not know 
that the case will proceed without them touches on constitutional concerns. A defendant 
who does not know that the case will proceed in his absence has not knowingly waived 
his right to presence and therefore should not be sentenced in absentia. Since nothing in 
the record establishes that Wanosik knew he would be sentenced in absentia, Wanosik 
did not knowingly waive his right to presence. 
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C. THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THAT PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
PROCEEDING OUTWEIGH THE DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN BEING 
PRESENT IN ORDER TO SENTENCE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IN 
ABSENTIA. 
In addition to requiring that any waiver of the right to presence must be knowingly 
and voluntarily made, this Court should utilize its supervisory power6 to require trial 
courts to weigh the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being 
present before allowing a defendant to be sentenced in absentia. Requiring trial courts to 
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present 
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. United States v. 
Fontanez. 878 F. 2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1989). The factors to be considered when 
balancing such interests include "the possibility that [the] defendant could be located 
within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty of rescheduling," and the burden on the 
state in not proceeding. People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 140-42,440 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 
1982). Application of such a balancing test helps make sure that only those cases where 
sentencing must proceed to preserve the state's interests go forward in the absence of the 
defendant, thereby protecting the right to presence along with the state's interests. 
6
 State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, ffl[12-14, 999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring), 
outlines numerous circumstances in which this Court has exercised its supervisory 
power. A review of that list demonstrates that requiring trial courts to balance the public 
interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present before proceeding 
in absentia is an appropriate area for this Court to exercise its supervisory powers. The 
importance of the right to presence, the integrity of the system, and respect for the dignity 
of individual defendants all require that this Court exert its supervisory influence in this 
context. 
27 
Various courts require that the interests of the parties be weighed before a court 
can sentence a defendant in absentia. See. Smith v. Mann. 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 
1999) (Mthe public interest in proceeding [must] clearly outweigh[] the interest of the 
voluntarily absent defendant in attending" in order to proceed in absentia); Fontanez . 
878 F.2d at 36-37 (same); Pinknev v. State. 711 A.2d 205, 219 (Md. 1998) (even if a 
defendant makes a constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to presence, court must 
consider all relevant factors before proceeding in absentia); Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1315-
17 (same). In Anderson, this Court also considered practical considerations, thereby 
employing a balancing test, before concluding that Anderson should be sentenced in 
absentia. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. 
A requirement that courts balance the interests before proceeding in absentia 
when there is a waiver is based on "the recognition that the public interest and 
confidence injudicial proceedings is best served by the presence of the defendant...." 
Pinknev, 711 A.2d at 214. Fairness, the appearance of justice, and the efficient 
administration of cases are all served by such a balancing test. In the sentencing context, 
such a balancing test recognizes the importance of a defendant's presence at sentencing 
not only so that he can give appropriate input to the court regarding information pertinent 
to sentencing, but also so that the court can address the defendant. Not all cases in which 
a defendant has waived his or her right to presence require that the state proceed in the 
absence of the defendant. See Pinknev. 711 P.2d at 214. Employing the balancing test 
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limits those cases that proceed in absentia to cases where such a procedure is necessary. 
The balancing test also lays to rest any concern about defendants who are trying to 
manipulate the system by not appearing. In cases where not proceeding would affect the 
administration of justice, the balancing test works in favor of proceeding in absentia. 
Application of the balancing test in this case demonstrates that the public interest 
in proceeding did not outweigh Wanosik's interest in being present. Wanosik could have 
been easily located and brought into court. He had lived in the area for fifty years and 
had a stable marital and work history. R. 8. His home address and employer's address 
and phone number were in the court file. R. 8. Given Wanosik's stability and ties to the 
community, it is probable that he could have been "located within a reasonable period of 
time" had the judge continued sentencing. Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317. 
The record does not show any burden on the state which would be caused by 
continuing the sentencing date. In fact, the favorable recommendation by AP&P, the 
minimal jail sentence recommended and the recommendation for treatment all 
demonstrate that society's interests would have been better served by rescheduling 
sentencing and bringing Wanosik before the court so that he would hear and understand 
the basis for the sentence and receive a sentence which included drug treatment rather 
than an extended jail stay. 
Moreover, because sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and 
appear on calendars with other sentencings and less time consuming matters, 
29 
rescheduling would not have been difficult. Because all of the considerations weighed in 
favor of rescheduling sentencing, society's interests and those of Wanosik would have 
been best served by continuing this sentencing. Judge Frederick therefore erred in 
sentencing Wanosik in absentia. 
D. THE ERROR IN SENTENCING WANOSIK IN ABSENTIA WAS 
HARMFUL. 
When the court errs in sentencing in absentia, the remedy is to require a new 
sentencing without considering harm. See. generally State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 
1071 (Utah 1993) (vacating sentence which was imposed in violation of due process), 
superceded bv statute on other grounds. 2000 UT App 230, 8 P.3d 274. Assuming, 
arguendo, a harmless error review is conducted, however, the focus is on the likelihood 
of a more favorable sentence if the defendant had been present. In this case, where 
AP&P recommended only twenty days jail based on Wanosik's favorable background 
but the judge imposed the maximum based only on Wanosik's nonappearance, the record 
demonstrates the error in proceeding in absentia was harmful.7 
7
 The Court of Appeals employed an incorrect analysis in assessing harm. Rather 
than remanding for a new sentencing based on the constitutional error or focusing on the 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error 
was harmless because Wanosik later wrote a letter indicating that he did not have a 
"legitimate excuse" for not being present at sentencing. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 
126. 
Wanosik's letter, written after he was in jail, is not pertinent to the issue of 
whether at the time of sentencing, Judge Frederick erred in proceeding in absentia since 
that letter was not available to the judge when he decided to proceed in absentia. The 
letter also does not relate to a determination as to whether the error in proceeding in 
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POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. CRIM. 
P. 22 IN SENTENCING WANOSIK TO THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM 
WITHOUT BASING THAT SENTENCE ON RELEVANT AND RELIABLE 
INFORMATION AND WITHOUT AFFORDING COUNSEL THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT SENTENCING. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and 
due process when he sentenced Wanosik in absentia without affording counsel the 
opportunity to address factors relevant to sentencing and without basing the sentence on 
reliable and relevant information. The Court of Appeals' decision was correct and 
should be upheld by his Court because (1) Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) furthers the due 
process requirements at sentencing by mandating that the trial court afford counsel the 
absentia was harmful because it does not relate to the effect of the error on the 
sentencing outcome. Instead, information which comes to light after a trial court has 
properly proceeded in absentia based on the circumstances known at the time of the 
decision is relevant to any attack on the decision to proceed in absentia made in a motion 
for new trial or to arrest judgment. When a court finds a valid waiver and proceeds in 
absentia, some "courts have reached the conclusion that the trial court has an obligation 
at a subsequent court proceeding to allow a criminal defendant the opportunity to explain 
the circumstances surrounding an absence at trial." Pinkney. 711 A.2d at 213-14. In this 
case, however, the initial conclusion was erroneous so a later reconsideration of 
Wanosik's reasons for being absent was not required. 
Moreover, Wanosik's letter does not fully consider the circumstances surrounding 
his nonappearance and is not a substitute for a hearing where counsel is present and 
might have been able to convey the reasons for Wanosik's nonappearance. The letter 
does not indicate Wanosik's reasons for not being present and instead simply indicates 
that he did not have a legitimate excuse. Wanosik may not have known, however, what a 
legitimate excuse might be. Confusion about the date, as suggested by defense counsel, 
could be a legitimate reason for not attending, but Wanosik might not have realized that. 
In the absence of a hearing, Wanosik's letter labeling his reason for not attending but not 
specifying that reason does not establish that Wanosik knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to presence. 
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opportunity to speak regarding factors relevant to sentencing; (2) the illegally imposed 
sentence was properly reviewed on appeal pursuant to rule 22(e); and (3) due process 
requires that all criminal sentences be based on relevant and reliable information. 
A. RULE 22(a) MANDATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT AFFORD 
COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS FACTORS RELEVANT TO 
SENTENCING. 
The state and federal due process clauses "require[] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence." State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071. 
A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See 
id. (vacating sentence based on unreliable PSR); State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1009 
(Utah 1982) (vacating sentence where defendant was not supplied with a copy of PSR). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) effectuates the due process requirement that a sentence be 
based on relevant and reliable information by requiring judges to give both parties the 
opportunity to present relevant information; see. Howell. 707 P.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure 
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear 
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to 
be imposed"). Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
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Rule 22(a) mandates that the court afford a defendant the opportunity not only to 
exercise his right to allocution8, but also to present any information which might mitigate 
the sentence or indicate that sentence should not be imposed. Since counsel acts as an 
advocate for defendant, the rule also requires that defense counsel be given the 
opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation of 
punishment. See generally Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1007 ("[sentencing is a critical stage of 
a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel"). Affording defense counsel the opportunity to make a statement and provide 
information in mitigation of sentence furthers the due process requirement of a fair and 
reliable sentencing proceeding in addition to ensuring that a defendant facing sentencing 
is afforded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Id. When the defendant is not 
present, affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak may provide the only means 
by which to present information in mitigation of punishment to the court. 
Recognizing the role of counsel at sentencing and interpreting rule 22(a) to meet 
Sixth Amendment protections, the Court of Appeals concluded that an absent defendant 
nevertheless has the right to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel. Wanosik, 
8
 The right to allocution is guaranteed by Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and the Utah 
Constitution. See State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 379-73 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (joined by Stewart, J., and Zimmerman, J., in holding that rule 
22(a) includes right to allocution); see. also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to 
allocution at sentencing is "an inseparable part of the right to be present," guaranteed by 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
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2001 UT App 241, [^30. In addition, the court recognized that the rule "unequivocally 
directs" sentencing judges to give the prosecution an opportunity to address sentencing 
factors and ,f[i]t would be patently unfair, in the case of an absent defendant, to hear only 
from the prosecuting attorney and not from defense counsel regarding sentencing 
considerations." Id Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the language of the 
rule and case law require the trial judge to offer defense counsel the opportunity to speak 
regarding sentencing factors regardless of whether counsel requests such an opportunity. 
The language of the rule is that "the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the rule imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to be heard; it 
does not contemplate the court will passively wait for counsel to make a request to 
be heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said that rule 22(a) "directs 
trial courts to hear evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is 
relevant to the sentence to be imposed." State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1985) [footnote omitted]. This directive is nowhere made conditional on a 
preliminary request by counsel to present the information. Even if a defendant is 
voluntarily absent, the trial court has the duty to set its aggravation aside and 
impose a reasonable sentence, and to that end the court is required to hear 
evidence from both sides relevant to sentencing. The onus is thus on the trial 
court to "afford" the defendant and to "give" the prosecutor the opportunity to 
present relevant information, [footnote omitted]. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). The 
trial court in this case erred by not affording defense counsel an opportunity to 
present information in mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, [^32 (emphasis added). 
Relying on a single case interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
state argues that while a federal court is required to extend "an affirmative invitation to 
the defendant to speak" regardless of whether the defendant requested an opportunity to 
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do so, the same affirmative obligation to give defense counsel an opportunity to speak is 
not required. State's brief at 17-18 (citing United States v. Vasquez. 216 F.3d 456, 458-
59 (5th Cir.) cert denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000)). Aside from the obvious problems of 
relying on Vasquez because it is the only case reaching this decision and interprets the 
federal rules, Vasquez also does not provide guidance because the circumstances were 
substantially different. The defendant was present in Vasquez and the judge extended 
the opportunity to the defendant to speak at sentencing. The court held under those 
circumstances, there was no obligation under the federal rules to extend an opportunity to 
speak to counsel who was present and did not ask to speak. By contrast, in the present 
case, defendant was not present and there was no attempt by the trial court to consider 
factors relevant to sentencing. While the sentencing court in Vasquez heard from the 
defendant and made an attempt to consider relevant factors, the court in this case did not. 
Other courts appear to take the requirement that the "shall afford" the opportunity 
at face value. See e ^ United States v. Sisti. 91 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Bvars. 290 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1961); Statev.Koon. 440 S.E.2d 442, 451 
(W.Va. 1993). Those cases parrot the language of the rule and require a court to afford 
defense counsel the opportunity to speak before imposing sentence. 
Requiring trial courts to let counsel know s/he can speak on behalf of the 
defendant will help ensure that full and fair sentencing hearings occur and will not 
encourage invited error. The rule is and will be clear to trial courts: they must ask for 
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input from defense counsel or the sentence will not be legally imposed. This requirement 
imposes no burden to trial courts and is in fact the procedure utilized by most sentencing 
judges regardless of whether defense counsel asks to speak. 
The state also argues that requiring courts to solicit information from both parties 
could lead to absurd results because a sentence might be vacated because the prosecutor 
was not given the opportunity to speak. State's brief at 19. In order to vacate a sentence 
on rule 22(a) grounds under Wanosik. noncompliance with rule 22(a) must be harmful in 
that the outcome for the defendant may have been more favorable absent the error. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^33. An error in failing to give the prosecutor the 
opportunity to speak would be harmful only when the prosecutor had information in 
mitigation of sentencing. In such circumstances, it would not be absurd to vacate a 
sentence; fairness and due process would require that the sentencing court hear such 
information if it might affect the sentencing determination.9 
Because the rule requires the court to afford the defendant the opportunity to 
speak, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court violated the rule when 
9
 The state suggests that the rule 22(a) analysis has already been taken to an 
improper extreme in State v. Hamling, 2001 UT App 267 (unpublished); see 
Addendum D. In Hamling., defense counsel was given the opportunity to speak at 
sentencing, but the prosecutor was not given such an opportunity. Hamling did not argue 
on appeal that rule 22(a) was violated. Instead, he argued that the trial court erred in 
sentencing him in absentia, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The state's purported 
concern about absurd extensions of Wanosik and its reliance on Hamling for that 
proposition are misplaced. 
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it concluded that Wanosik waived his right to presence then proceeded to sentence 
Wanosik without pausing and without giving defense counsel an opportunity to address 
factors relevant to sentencing. This approach furthers the due process goal of a full and 
fair sentencing hearing. 
B. THE UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(a) VIOLATION WAS PROPERLY 
REVIEWED PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e). 
The state also claims that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the sentence 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). According to the state, the Court of Appeals was 
required to employ a plain error review because a sentence imposed in violation of 
rule 22(a) is not an illegally imposed sentence which qualifies for review at any time.10 
10
 Petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals incorrectly proceeded under 
rule 22(e) relates only to the rule 22(a) violation. The Court of Appeals did not rely on 
rule 22(e) to reach the error in sentencing Wanosik in absentia or the error in sentencing 
him in violation of the due process requirement that sentences be based on relevant and 
reliable information. Wanosik. 2001 Ut App 241, |^28, n. 11. 
The due process claims relating to sentencing Wanosik in absentia and without 
conducting a full sentencing hearing or relying on relevant and reliable information were 
preserved in this case. R. 54:2-4. In fact, after the trial court proceeded to sentence 
Wanosik without giving either party an opportunity to speak, defense counsel attempted 
to interject her objection. She was part way through her objection when the court cut her 
off. Defense counsel stated, "Judge, I would object to that order because I don't think 
that it takes into account his due process rights or his rights about - -." R. 54:4. The state 
does not argue that reviewing the due process and absentia issues was error. See 
Petitioner's brief at 20. 
Moreover, Wanosik and the many other defendants who brought this issue to the 
Court of Appeals argued that the error could be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. 
See Wanosik's reply brief at 2-3. The plain language of rule 22(a) and the due process 
requirements at sentencing as outlined in, inter alia, Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071 made the 
error in not affording counsel the opportunity to speak and not basing the sentence on 
relevant information obvious. The error prejudiced Wanosik since the presentence report 
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As a preliminary matter, this Court should refuse to review this claim because the 
state did not raise that issue in its petition for writ of certiorari, and an argument that the 
issue was not properly reviewed by the Court of Appeals and therefore the Court of 
Appeals should be overruled on procedural grounds is not fairly included in the questions 
presented by the state in its petition. See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 
856 (Utah 1998) (review limited to issues raised in petitions or fairly included therein). 
Moreover, the state's claim that rule 22(e) does not apply to this illegally imposed 
sentence is incorrect. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) provides that ff[t]he court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(e) (emphasis added). The state's argument that the sentence imposed in violation 
of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) is not an illegal sentence for rule 22(e) purposes disregards the 
language of the rule that allows for review not only of an illegal sentence, but also of a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner. 
Rule 22(e) allows a trial or appellate court to review an illegal sentence or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any time. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 
(Utah 1995). Allowing an appellate court to vacate a sentence pursuant to rule 22(e). 
recommended only twenty days of jail and, instead, the trial judge imposed the statutory 
maximum. 
The Court of Appeals therefore had several means by which it could review these 
errors: straight preservation, Utah Rule Crim. P. 22(e) and plain error. Even if the state 
were correct in its rule 22(e) analysis, which it is not, this issue could properly be vacated 
on appeal either as plain error or because the trial court did not allow defense counsel to 
fully state her objection. 
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even though the issue was not raised below "makes theoretical sense because an illegal 
sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at any time." IcL at 
860. In addition, "considerations of judicial economy" also support the determination 
that an appellate court can review a challenge to a sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) which 
is raised for the first time on appeal. Id. 
While rule 22(e) allows an appellate court to review a challenge to the legality of a 
sentence which is raised for the first time on appeal, rule 22(e) "does not allow an 
appellate court to review the legality of a sentence when the substance of the appeal is 
not a challenge to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction." Id_ In other 
words, "[a] request to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) presupposes a valid 
conviction" and "issues concerning the validity of a conviction are not cognizable under 
rule 22(e)." IcL On the other hand, challenges to the legality of the sentence are 
reviewable under rule 22(e). 
The rationale outlined by this Court in Brooks for allowing an appellate court to 
review an illegal sentence when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal applies 
with equal force to this case. The sentence is illegal because the correct procedure for 
imposing sentence was not utilized; the sentence therefore is void. Considerations of 
judicial economy support the notion that the sentence should have been vacated on 
appeal rather than requiring the defendant to seek relief elsewhere. 
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A rule 22(a) violation fits within the types of matters which can be reviewed under 
rule 22(e). Not only is the sentence illegal because it was imposed without due process 
or rule 22(a) protections, it also was imposed in an illegal manner because Judge 
Frederick failed to comply with rule 22(a). Pursuant to the plain language of rule 22(e), 
this illegally imposed sentence could be reviewed for the first time on appeal. 
The state's argument that this case does not fit within the categories of cases in 
which this Court has reviewed an error under rule 22(e) is not convincing. See State's 
brief at 21-24. The rule does not limit review to cases in which the sentence is 
ambiguous, the court lacks jurisdiction, or the sentence exceeds that which is authorized 
by law. Instead, rule 22(e) applies to any illegal sentence or any sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner. Just because this Court has not yet addressed a rule 22(a) claim pursuant 
to rule 22(e) does not mean that such a claim does not fall within the rule. 
Moreover, the state's list of cases which have held that the claim cannot be 
addressed under rule 22(e) support the notion that Wanosik's attack on his sentence was 
properly reviewed under rule 22(e). All of the cases listed by the state in which a Utah 
appellate court has refused to review a claim under rule 22(e) involve attacks on the 
conviction rather than the sentence. 
State v. Wareham is the only case cited by the state in support of this argument 
which merits comment. 801 P.2d 918 , 919-920 & n. 3 (Utah 1990). In Wareham. like 
the other cases where this Court has refused to review an issue under rule 22(e), the 
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defendant was attacking his conviction rather than his sentence. After Wareham's 
conviction was affirmed on appeal, Wareham raised a new issue, claiming that the 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child statute was improperly applied to him because it was 
enacted after his crime. The change in the statute elevated a second degree felony sexual 
abuse of a child to a first degree felony aggravated sexual abuse of a child if the added 
element that the defendant committed five or more acts was found. This Court rejected 
Wareham's arguments in his second appeal because they were an attack on his conviction 
which should have been brought in the original appeal. Id. at 920. While the Court did 
not directly analyze the application of rule 22(e) in this context, a conclusion that the 
claim could not be reviewed pursuant to rule 22(e) is consistent with this Court's case 
law which limits rule 22(e) review to challenges to the sentence. 
The state's claim that Wareham involved a sentencing enhancement and is an 
example of a case where this Court refused rule 22(e) review where ,f[t]he trial court 
bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors" (state's brief at 23) is simply incorrect. 
Wareham involved an attack on the conviction and rule 22(e) treatment was therefore 
improper. Moreover, as the state recognizes (State's brief at 24 n. 9), the recent decision 
in State v. Maeuire, 1999 UT App 45, ^ [6 n. 1, 975 P.2d 476 recognizes that this type of 
issue can be reviewed for the first time on appeal under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
The state's reliance on New Jersey and Florida case law is likewise not 
compelling. Those cases do not deal with this situation, are not persuasive, and are based 
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on rules which do not contain the same language as the Utah rule. Indeed, neither rule 
includes language regarding imposition of a sentence in an illegal manner. 
Rule 22(e) is designed to allow review in precisely this type of case. There is no 
question the trial judge ignored the requirements of due process and rule 22(a) when he 
sentenced Wanosik. The illegality of these sentences requires review and rule 22(e) 
plainly allows for such review. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
WANOSIK'S SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED WHERE THE TRIAL 
JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT A FULL AND FAIR SENTENCING HEARING 
AND THE SENTENCE WAS NOT BASED ON RELEVANT AND RELIABLE 
INFORMATION. 
" A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of 
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system.11 State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980). Although a sentencing judge has discretion in imposing sentence, s/he must 
nevertheless impose sentence in a reliable manner which fits due process requirements. 
Indeed, Utah appellate courts "have consistently sought 'to shore up the soundness and 
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that 
sentencing discretion/" Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, [^34 (quoting State v. Lipskv, 608 
P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980)). A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant 
information must be vacated. Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071-75; Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1009. 
The Court of Appeals recognized the due process requirements and need for 
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reliability at sentencing in this case. Because the record failed to disclose any factor 
other than Wanosik's absence from sentencing upon which the sentencing court relied, 
the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had violated due process. The Court stated: 
The record in this case fails to disclose any relevant or reliable information, 
other than the fact that defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by the 
trial court in imposing maximum - - albeit concurrent - - sentences for both 
crimes. Voluntary absence from sentencing may properly serve as one factor in 
determining an appropriate sentence, as it is an indirect - - but telling - - indication 
of the defendant's suitability for probation or susceptibility to rehabilitative 
efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to rely on that fact alone in deciding what 
sentence to impose, nor may such absence be punished by imposing a sentence 
more severe than is otherwise warranted. From all that appears in the record, 
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the only information considered 
by the trial court in deciding what sentences to impose. 
Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised by the trial court's failure 
to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the 
crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of society. For the same reasons 
noted in the preceding section, the trial court's failure to base its sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliable information was not harmless. 
Id. 1135-36. 
1. Although the Court of Appeals Did Not Hold that Due Process Requires the 
Sentencing Judge to Solicit Information from the Parties, Such a Requirement Fits 
within the Due Process Requirements at Sentencing. 
The state argues that the decision is incorrect because due process does not require 
the trial court to affirmatively solicit sentencing information. Petitioner's brief at 28. 
While the Court of Appeals held that Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) required the trial judge to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing, it 
did not directly hold that due process required the court to solicit such information. 
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Instead, the Court of Appeals held that due process required the trial judge to base his 
sentencing decision on reliable and relevant information, and that M[t]he record in this 
case fails to disclose any relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that 
defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by the trial court in imposing 
maximum - - albeit concurrent - - sentences for both crimes." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 
241, Tff 35-36. That holding is firmly grounded in Utah case law. See e.g. Johnson, 856 
P.2d at 1071; Howell. 707 P.2d at 118; Lipskv. 608 P.2d at 249. 
Although the Court of Appeals based its due process analysis on the trial court's 
"failure to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information," requiring 
the judge to affirmatively solicit sentencing input as part of the due process protection at 
sentencing would ensure that due process concerns are met at sentencing. In any case 
where the judge does not have reliable and relevant sentencing information before him, 
soliciting that information from counsel facilitates the requirement that the sentencing 
decision be based on relevant and reliable information while also ensuring that a full and 
fair sentencing hearing is held. 
The state argues, however, that soliciting sentencing information from the parties 
is not required by due process based on a single case issued by this Court over thirty 
years ago. See state's brief at 28-29. According to the state, State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d 
297, 299 (Utah 1969), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935 (1972), which concluded that the 
failure to ask a defendant, who is represented by counsel, whether he wants to exercise 
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his allocution right "does not in itself constitute constitutional error," resolves this issue. 
Kelbach does not resolve the issue of whether due process requires a sentencing 
court to solicit information from the parties for a number of reasons. First, Kelbach 
discusses a defendant's right to allocution, not the defendant's due process right to have 
sentencing based on relevant and reliable information. Kelbach was represented by 
counsel and a penalty hearing was otherwise held. In that context, where the sentencing 
authority was presented with information relevant to sentencing, this Court simply 
concluded that the trial court was not also required to ask the defendant whether he 
wanted to speak. Kelbach involved an entirely different situation than the present case 
where no information relevant to sentencing was presented. 
Second, Kelbach leaves open the possibility that while failing to ask the defendant 
whether he wants to allocute "does not in itself constitute constitutional error," 
when coupled with a failure to solicit any information relevant to sentencing, 
constitutional error might occur. In other words, Kelbach does not address the situation 
in the present case where no information is presented to the sentencing court. 
Third, Kelbach is disfavored not only because it has been overruled, but also 
because the passage of time and changes in the law bring its conclusion into question. 
See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 376-77 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). The 
more recent decisions of Anderson, Johnson, Howell, Lipsky, and Young all bring into 
question what continuing life, if any, this conclusion in Kelbach might have. 
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Finally, Kelbach does not resolve the issue of whether the sentencing judge must 
solicit information from the parties because, at most, Kelbach addresses only federal 
constitutional concerns. See Young, 853 P.2d at 377 (Durham, J., concurring and 
dissenting). The due process protections at sentencing embraced in Johnson. Howell and 
Lipsky are all firmly rooted in the state constitutional due process protection. Those 
cases suggest that a sentencing judge is required to solicit information from parties in 
order to meet state due process concerns at sentencing. 
2. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Record Failed to Show that the 
Trial Court Based the Imposition of the Statutory Maximum Sentence on Relevant 
and Reliable Information. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the record does not include any 
relevant or reliable information, other than Wanosik's absence, which was relied on by 
the trial court in imposing the maximum sentence. See. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
Tf30. While defense counsel indicated on the record that the presentence report was 
favorable, she was not afforded the opportunity to discuss specific information or 
recommendations in the report. R. 54:1-4. Nor did the judge acknowledge the 
information or recommendations in the presentence report during the hearing. See 
generally R. 54. Instead, the trial court concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent 
and moved immediately into sentencing him to the maximum term. R. 54:2-4. 
The trial court's gross deviation from the PSR recommendation without 
acknowledging the details of the PSR or indicating the basis for the deviation 
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demonstrates that the judge failed to consider the information in the PSR when assessing 
sentence. When that gross deviation is considered in the context of the hearing, where 
the judge focused only on the defendant's absence and did not seem to think any 
additional information was necessary in order to sentence Wanosik, it is apparent that the 
judge did not consider additional factors. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) 
(1999) requires that the trial court receive information relevant to sentencing in open 
court. In this case, the only information presented in open court was the fact of 
Wanosik's absence. The record more than adequately demonstrates that the judge based 
the sentence solely on Wanosik's absence. 
In addition, however, the Court of Appeals had a number of other appeals pending 
before it in which this same judge sentenced defendants to the statutory maximum when 
the defendant did not appear at sentencing. See footnote 1, supra at 2. In each case, the 
judge imposed the statutory maximum based solely on the defendant's absence. These 
other cases further demonstrate that the judge did not consider relevant and reliable 
information and instead based the decision to impose the maximum sentence solely on 
Wanosik's absence. 
A review of the record further demonstrates that relevant factors did not support 
the imposition of a maximum sentence. Wanosik was convicted of class A attempted 
possession of a controlled substance and class B possession after he was detained and 
searched when found rummaging through a Deseret Industries bin of donated items. 
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R. 5-6, 18-23. The AP&P agents, who are experienced in preparing presentence reports 
and supervising probation, lfbelieve[] the defendant is a good candidate for some type of 
supervised probation." PSR at 10. Based on Wanosik's background and the relatively 
minor nature of the crimes, the PSR recommends that Wanosik serve twenty days of jail, 
with credit for the eight days, then be placed on probation. PSR at 11. 
Additional information supported probation rather than a maximum sentence. 
Wanosik had been married for twenty-four years and had a relatively stable work history. 
PSR at 5, 8. He had only one conviction in 1995 for retail theft. PSR at 4.11 This 
additional favorable information further demonstrates that the sentence was not based on 
relevant and reliable factors. 
The state complains that reviewing the context of this record and concluding that 
the judge based the sentence solely on absence conflicts with the presumption of 
regularity. The application of such a presumption as the state suggests would curtail the 
constitutional protections mandating a full and fair procedure. According to the state's 
argument, any sentence must be constitutionally acceptable, regardless of how unfair the 
procedure or how minimal or nonexistent the hearing, because the sentence is presumed 
to be fair. No such presumption saves the unfair and unconstitutional sentencing 
11
 The PSR also contains three remote arrests in the early 1970's. PSR at 4. 
Without a disposition showing a conviction, these charges could not properly be 
considered to increase the sentence. In addition, the passage of a significant amount of 
time-close to thirty years-made these remote arrests of no significance to the sentencing 
decision. 
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procedure utilized in this case. 
Moreover, any presumption of regularity which may attach has been more than 
overcome. The only information considered in open court was Wanosik's absence. The 
judge did not afford counsel the opportunity to address sentencing factors and instead 
concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent then proceeded to immediately sentence 
him to the maximum term. Even if a presumption of regularity did attach to sentencing 
proceedings, that presumption was more than overcome by the procedure utilized at 
sentencing in this case.12 
In this case where the trial court failed to conduct a full and fair sentencing 
hearing and failed to impose sentence based on relevant and reliable information, the 
sentence was properly vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
Moreover, even if a harmless error review were required, harm is evident in this case 
where the PSR recommended twenty days jail. Had the judge based the sentence in this 
12
 The state has not argued on certiorari review that absence alone is sufficient to 
impose the statutory maximum sentence. This probably is the case because it is clear that 
the sentence must be based on more than the single factor of absence. See McClendon, 
611 P.2d at 729 ("A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant 
in light of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society 
which underlie the criminal justice system.M). Moreover, common sense dictates that 
imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a failure to appear can result in sentences 
which are not appropriate in light of society's interest, the nature of the crime, or the 
defendant's background and which impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. 
While ramifications for failing to appear such as being picked up on a warrant and 
having to spend several days in jail while waiting to see a judge should and do exist, 
scarce bed space at jails is not best utilized when the defendant's background and crime 
do not warrant the maximum sentence. 
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case on relevant and reliable factors, the outcome would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Anthony Wanosik respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / t £ day of July, 2002. 
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Defendant who pleaded guilty to drug charges in the 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., and was sentenced in absentia. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) defendant was not entitled to explicit warning that, 
even if defendant were absent, the court might proceed 
with sentencing; (2) sentencing court was required to 
inquire into defendant's ability to appear at sentencing 
proceeding, and State was required to make preliminary 
showing of voluntariness of defendant's absence, 
before sentencing court could decide that defendant 
had waived his right to be present; (3) sentencing 
court's failure to properly inquire into whether 
defendant's absence at sentencing hearing was 
voluntary was harmless error; and (4) sentencing 
court's failure to hear evidence from prosecutor and 
defense counsel at sentencing hearing was not harmless 
error. 
Vacated and remanded. 
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Before JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, ORME 
and THORNE, Judges. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
| 1 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik appeals the 
sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to his 
guilty pleas to attempted unlawful possession or use of 
a controlled substance and unlawful possession or use 
of a controlled substance, class A and B misdemeanors, 
respectively, each in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2000). We vacate the 
sentences and remand for resentencing. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 The facts are undisputed. Wanosik pled guilty to 
two misdemeanor drug offenses. At the plea hearing, 
the trial court told Wanosik that sentencing would be 
held on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., and ordered 
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP 
& P) for preparation of a presentence report. The trial 
court did not specifically inform Wanosik that he could 
be sentenced in absentia if he failed to appear for 
sentencing. 
K 3 Wanosik reported to AP & P, and a presentence 
report was completed. AP & P recommended that 
Wanosik be sentenced to twenty days in jail with credit 
for time served and that he then be committed to a 
substance abuse treatment program. 
f 4 A sentencing hearing was held as scheduled on 
May 26, 2000. Wanosik was represented at the 
hearing by counsel but did not appear personally at the 
hearing or at any other time that morning. 
% 5 Defense counsel expressed to the court her belief 
that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing but 
had perhaps written down the wrong date. Defense 
counsel asked the court to wait before issuing an arrest 
warrant to give counsel time to locate Wanosik. The 
court denied defense counsel's request and proceeded 
to impose sentence: 
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will terminate 
his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for his arrest 
returnable forthwith no bail. My inclination is to 
sentence him today, and I recognize you would 
prefer that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is 
curious that he has failed to appear today, although 
I can only assume because he has not been in touch 
with you nor has he been in touch with my court that 
he has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from 
these proceedings. 
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this 
Court that he serve the term provided by law in the 
adult detention center of one year for the class A 
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, and six months for the 
possession of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor 
charge to which he has pled guilty. I will order that 
those terms be served concurrently and not 
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consecutively, and that they be imposed forthwith. 
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or 
shows up before he's arrested, then you may 
approach me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro, 
you prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order determining voluntary absent compliance, 
and that will be the order. 
Defense counsel promptly objected: 
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that order 
because I don't think that it takes into account his due 
process rights or his rights about--
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your 
order. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant 
him credit for the eight days he served awaiting 
imposition or a resolution. 
The hearing was then immediately concluded. The 
prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandro, was present but made no 
statement during the sentencing hearing, and the court 
addressed the prosecutor only to direct him to prepare 
the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
f 6 On June 14,2000, Wanosik, through counsel, filed 
a timely notice of appeal of the sentences imposed in 
his absence. Wanosik was arrested a few months later 
on the warrant issued at the sentencing. After his 
arrest, *620 Wanosik sent a brief handwritten letter to 
the trial court in which he forthrightly acknowledged, 
with his own emphasis: "I do not have a legitimate 
excuse" for being absent at sentencing. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f 7 Wanosik makes two general claims on appeal: (1) 
that sentencing should not have proceeded in his 
absence; and (2) that even if sentencing him in 
absentia was proper, the trial court erred by the manner 
in which it conducted sentencing. 
f 8 Under Wanosik's first general claim, i.e., that 
sentencing should not have proceeded in his absence, 
we address several distinct issues. First, we address 
Wanosik's contention that, as a matter of law, a 
defendant's absence at sentencing cannot be deemed 
voluntary if the defendant was not warned that 
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary absence. 
This contention presents a purely legal question, which 
we review for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Second, we address 
Wanosik's argument that even if a defendant's ibsence 
is properly deemed voluntary, the trial court may not 
proceed with sentencing without first balancing 
society's interest in proceeding and the defendant's 
interest in being present. This argument also presents 
a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
See id. Third, we believe that sound analysis requires 
us to address whether, in this case, the trial court's 
inquiry regarding the voluntariness of Wanosik's 
absence was properly conducted. Specifically, we 
address the questions of what type of inquiry is 
required of the trial court in making the factual 
determination of voluntariness; who has the burden of 
proving voluntariness; and what type of evidence may 
suffice to meet that burden. These are all legal 
questions, which, again, we review for correctness. 
See id. Finally, we conclude this first section of the 
opinion by considering whether any error by the trial 
court was harmless. 
f 9 Wanosik's second claim is that, even assuming 
proceeding with sentencing in his absence was 
appropriate, "[t]he trial court violated due process and 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22[ (a) ] when it sentenced [Wanosik] 
without considering relevant and reliable information 
and without affording defense counsel or the 
prosecutor the opportunity to speak at sentencing." 
These assertions require us to interpret both the 
mandates of Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the requirements of Due Process at 
sentencing. Each of these inquiries pose questions of 
law, which we review for correctness, granting no 
particular deference to the conclusions of the trial 
court. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 
P.3d 540 ("[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure 
is a question of law that we review for correctness."); 
State v. Valencia,200\ UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573 
("Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of 
law, which we review for correctness."). 
I. Sentencing in Absentia 
D][2][3] 1 10 We begin by addressing Wanosik's 
claim that the trial court erred by sentencing him in his 
absence. A criminal defendant's right to be present at 
all stages of trial includes the right to be present at 
sentencing. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1109-11 (Utah 1996). "To intentionally relinquish the 
right to be present, the defendant must have notice of 
the proceedings." Id at 1110. See Utah R.Crim. P. 
17(a)(2), 22(b). "However, this right may be waived... 
[by] the [defendant's] voluntary absence from 
[sentencing]. This waiver must be voluntary and 
involve an intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted). [FN1] 
FN 1. Wagstaffinvolved a defendant's absence 
from trial rather than from sentencing. See 
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772 P.2d at 988-89. The Utah Supreme 
Court, however, has previously relied on both 
Wagstaff and State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam), another Utah case 
involving a defendant's absence at trial, in 
addressing a criminal defendant's right to be 
present at sentencing. See State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Wagstaff, m?2d<it990\ Houtz,! UP 2d at 
678). Likewise, the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure treat identically a defendant's right 
to be present at trial and a defendant's right to 
be present at sentencing. See Utah R.Crim. 
P. 22(b). We therefore see no basis on which 
to distinguish between trial and sentencing in 
our analysis of a defendant's right to be 
present and a defendant's voluntary waiver of 
that right. 
*621 A. Specific Warning of Consequences 
[4] f 11 Notwithstanding that the Utah case law and 
rules referred to above appear to require only notice to 
defendant of the proceedings and of the right to be 
present in order to permit the court to proceed to a 
determination whether a defendant's voluntary absence 
is a waiver of the right to be present, Wanosik argues 
that a further warning is required. Specifically, 
Wanosik argues he was entitled to be warned that the 
court might proceed with sentencing if he were to be 
voluntarily absent. [FN2] We disagree. 
FN2. Wanosik references both the Utah 
Constitution and the United States 
Constitution as well as the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in making this argument. 
However, 
[n]o argument has been made as to why, if we 
were to uphold the [sentencing] under the 
Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result 
would be different under either the Utah or 
the federal constitution. We will therefore 
treat the contention as a single argument with 
three legal bases rather than as three separate 
arguments. 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 n. 3 
(Utah 1996). 
[5][6] 1f 12 To require an explicit warning that 
sentencing will proceed even in the defendant's 
voluntary absence is to conclude that, without such a 
warning, defendants will assume they have the right to 
avoid sentencing simply by refusing to appear. See 
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17,20,94 S.Ct. 194, 
196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam). It is 
inimical to the common respect due our governmental 
institutions for us to indulge in the presumption that 
persons will assume they have the right to impede the 
judicial system by deliberately absenting themselves 
from criminal proceedings to which they are a party. 
See id. ("It seems ... incredible to us ... 'that a 
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of 
a trial-where judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are 
present and ready to continue-would not know that as 
a consequence the trial could continue in his absence.' 
" (citation omitted)). [FN3] "The right at issue is the 
right to be present." Id. Notice of the proceeding is 
alone sufficient to allow a defendant to exercise the 
right to be present by appearing, or to waive that right 
through voluntary absence. See id. Whether it be trial 
or sentencing, we must presume defendants fully 
understand that important proceedings will go forward 
without them in the event of their voluntary absence. 
[FN4] Thus, there is no need to specially warn 
defendants of this obvious fact. 
FN3. We acknowledge that a defendant who 
flees in the midst of a trial may have more 
reason to know that the proceedings will 
move forward in his absence than a defendant 
who absents himself from sentencing after 
entering a guilty plea. We nevertheless 
remain unpersuaded that a warning is required 
to disabuse defendants of the belief that they 
may prevent their own sentencing through 
deliberate absence from the sentencing 
proceeding. We therefore, again, do not 
distinguish between the right to be present at 
trial from the right to be present at sentencing, 
in terms of what type of notice is required to 
deem a defendant's voluntary absence a 
knowing waiver of the right to be present. 
See note 1. 
FN4. Nor is this some unique feature of the 
judicial system that will be foreign to the 
average citizen. Whether one is a season 
ticket holder or a team member, a scheduled 
basketball game will go forward whether or 
not he or she shows up. If one does not 
appear for a scheduled dental or medical 
appointment, he or she should expect to be 
billed anyway. If one misses an employment 
interview without prior explanation, he or she 
knows the job will go to someone else. 
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While the uniqueness of judicial business 
makes these examples less than perfect, the 
expectation in contemporary American society 
is that one should appear at duly scheduled 
events or be willing to accept the 
ramifications of his or her voluntary absence. 
In most social and commercial arenas, an 
expectation of unexcused absence without 
consequence is not the order of the day. 
113 Wanosik observes that although neither Wagstqff 
nor Anderson addresses whether a specific warning is 
required, such a requirement would not be inconsistent 
with the holdings of those cases. However, the only 
federal case Wanosik cites directly supporting his 
proposition that a specific warning is required to 
inform defendants that sentencing may proceed in their 
voluntary absence is United States v. McPherson, 421 
F.2d 1127 (D.C.Cir.1969), which held that such a 
warning is required. See id. at 1129-30. The United 
States Supreme Court has, however, explicitly rejected 
McPherson 's holding requiring such a warning. See 
Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20 n. 3,94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3 ("[T]he 
Court of Appeals ... disagreed with *622 McPherson, 
and, in our view, rightly so."). [FN5] Nonetheless, 
Wanosik maintains that McPherson's holding is good 
law and cites the more recent United States Supreme 
Court case, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255,113 
S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), as "further support 
for the McPherson requirement." Crosby, however, 
does not undermine Taylor 's rejection of McPherson 
' s warning requirement. 
FN5. Wanosik observes that the Utah 
Supreme Court has cited McPherson with 
approval. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court's reliance on McPherson 
extended only to the proposition that "[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, 
the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings." Id. Nowhere does Anderson 
intimate that any further warning is required. 
Indeed, Anderson implicitly rejects the notion 
that a further warning is required by affirming 
the sentencing, in absentia, of a defendant 
who, although he waived in writing his right 
to be present at trial, was not explicitly 
warned that sentencing would proceed in his 
voluntary absence. See id. at 1110-11. 
114 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and holds that, under the explicit 
language of that rule, a court may never commence trial 
in a defendant's absence. [FN6] See 506 U.S. at 
258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53. The Crosby Court also 
observes, however, that under Rule 43 a defendant's 
absence after trial has commenced will automatically 
be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to be present, 
even without prior warning to the defendant regarding 
the consequences of voluntary absence. See 506 U.S. 
at 261-62,113 S.Ct. at 752. Thus, like Taylor, Crosby 
concludes that in circumstances where the federal rules 
otherwise allow for trial in absentia, a warning is not 
required to inform defendants that voluntary absence 
will likely result in trial in absentia. See Crosby, 506 
U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752; Taylor, 414 U.S. at 
20, 94 S.Ct. at 196. 
FN6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states in relevant part: 
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall 
be present at the arraignment, at the time of 
the plea, at every stage of the trial including 
the impaneling of the jury and the return of 
the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, 
except as otherwise provided by this rule, (b) 
Continued Presence Not Required. The 
further progress of the trial to and including 
the return of the verdict shall not be prevented 
and the defendant shall be considered to have 
waived the right to be present whenever a 
defendant, initially present, 
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has 
commenced (whether or not the defendant has 
been informed by the court of the obligation 
to remain during the trial)[.] 
[7] | 15 Significantly, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
differ in an important respect highlighted by Crosby. 
Federal Rule 43 treats differently absence at the 
commencement of trial from absence after the 
commencement of trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 43; 
Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53. The 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure draw no such 
distinction, but rather treat a defendant's absence at any 
stage of criminal proceedings similarly to the federal 
rule's treatment of a defendant's absence after 
commencement of trial. [FN7] Compare Utah R.Crim. 
P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a) & (b)(1). 
Thus, for our purposes, the significance of Crosby is 
that it affirms the United States Supreme Court's view 
that a warning of the consequences of voluntary 
absence is not required to deem a defendant's absence 
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after commencement of trial voluntary. Our holding, 
therefore, accords with that of the United States 
Supreme Court when we conclude that a defendant 
need not be warned that the proceedings may go 
forward in his absence in order to deem voluntary 
absence a knowing waiver of the right to be present. 
Thus, although at least one state mandates a warning 
like that required in McPherson, see People v. Link, 
291 IU.App.3d 1064,226 Ill.Dec. 369,685 N.E.2d 624, 
626 (1997), we, with the United States Supreme Court, 
decline to adopt McPherson's holding. 
FN7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by 
death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time 
for trial shall not prevent the case from being 
tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein 
shall have the same effect as if defendant had 
been present.... 
Furthermore, Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(b) states: "On the same grounds 
that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced 
in defendant's absence." 
*623 f 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date and 
time of his sentencing. He had the right to appear if he 
chose; he had no right to assume the matter could be 
taken care of some other time, when he felt more in the 
mood to attend. We see no error in the trial court's 
failure to specifically warn Wanosik that sentencing 
would proceed in the event of his voluntary absence 
from the proceeding. 
B. Balancing of Interests 
[8] | 17 Relying on two in a line of cases from the 
Second Circuit, Wanosik argues that even if a 
defendant's absence is properly deemed knowing and 
voluntary, a trial court may not proceed unless "the 
public interest in proceeding clearly outweighs the 
interest of the voluntarily absent defendant in 
attending." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d73,76(2ndCir.), 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 884,120 S.Ct. 200,145 L.Ed.2d 
168 (1999). See United States v. Fontanel, 878 F.2d 
33,37(2ndCir.l989). 
\ 18 The Second Circuit acknowledges "that while [it 
believes] prudential concerns animate the need for a 
balancing of interests before a district court exercises 
its discretion to conduct a trial in absentia, all that the 
Constitution requires is a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to be present at trial." Mann, 173 
F.3d at 76 (emphasis added). Accord Clark v. Scott, 
70 F.3d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir.1995), cert, denied, 528 
U.S. 884,120 S.Ct. 200,145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999). The 
Second Circuit has thus, out of "prudential concerns," 
hedged their trial courts' discretion to proceed in a 
defendant's absence by imposing a judicially created 
balancing test not required by either the federal rules or 
the United States Constitution. We decline the 
invitation to adopt a similar balancing test in Utah. 
When a defendant's absence from a criminal 
proceeding is properly deemed knowing and voluntary, 
the trial court may proceed without further inquiry or 
analysis. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court 
in this case to fail to balance the public interest in 
proceeding against Wanosik's interest in being present. 
C. Voluntariness Inquiry 
[9] [ 10] [ 11 ] f 19 We haveconcluded that a trial court is 
not required to warn a defendant that trial or 
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary 
absence. We have also concluded that a trial court is 
not required to balance the public interest in resolving 
the matter against the defendant's interest in being 
present before proceeding in a defendant's voluntary 
absence. However, a trial court may not assume a 
defendant's knowing absence is voluntary, but rather is 
required to determine whether a defendant's absence is 
in fact voluntary. [FN8] See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 
677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). We therefore 
review whether the trial court in this case properly 
concluded that Wanosik's absence at sentencing was 
actually voluntary. 
FN8. The fact that a defendant was informed 
of the time and place of the proceeding allows 
a court to presume that a defendant's absence 
therefrom is knowing, i.e., that the defendant 
knows he is missing the proceeding. The fact 
that an absent defendant had notice of the 
proceeding does not, however, allow a 
presumption that absence therefrom is 
voluntary. See Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. 
After all, such a defendant may be 
incarcerated on another charge or comatose in 
a hospital. 
K 20 The sum of the trial court's oral findings and 
analysis on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence at 
sentencing is the following: [FN9] "I can only assume 
because he has not been in touch with [defense 
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counsel] nor has he been in touch with my court that he 
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from these 
proceedings." We do not question the underlying 
findings of the trial court, i.e., that Wanosik had not 
been in touch with counsel or the court. These 
findings, however, suggest nothing more than that no 
one knew why Wanosik was absent. With no reliable 
information on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence, 
the trial court merely assumed that Wanosik's absence 
was voluntary. [FN 10] 
FN9. The trial court's written findings and 
conclusions do not substantively differ from 
what the court stated orally at the hearing. 
FN 10. As hereafter more fully explained, case 
law rejects the legitimacy of such an 
assumption, but it is not intrinsically an 
unreasonable one. Statistically, the vast 
majority of court no-shows spaced it out, 
could not muster the courage or effort to be 
present, or got sidetracked in some volitional 
way. Only a tiny minority find themselves 
comatose or otherwise involuntarily 
incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing. 
Even those who are incarcerated, assuming it 
is in this state, usually have the means to let 
their circumstances be known. Cf In re A.E., 
2001 UT App 202, J 5,29 P.3d 31 ("Father... 
was not transported from the jail for the trial 
because he did not inform jail officials of the 
trial dates."). 
*624[12][13][14][15H21 "[Voluntariness may not 
be presumed by the trial court." Houtz, 714 P.2d at 
678. Rather, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to 
appear at the proceeding is required. See id. We have 
not previously detailed the type of inquiry required to 
determine if a defendant's absence is voluntary. We 
have, however, outlined some general principles: 
Voluntariness is determined by considering the 
totality of the circumstances. The state carries the 
burden of showing voluntariness. A defendant must 
have a compelling reason to stay away from the trial. 
If his absence is deliberate without a sound reason, 
the trial may start in his absence. 
State v. Wagstajf, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). This case presents an opportunity to 
elaborate on these general principles. 
[16][17] Tf 22 In such circumstances, the State must 
make a preliminary showing, based on reasonable 
inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary. Except 
as otherwise required by the attorney-client privilege, 
defense counsel has an obligation to aid thu tate by 
being forthcoming with any information aefense 
counsel may have that could be helpful in determining 
the defendant's whereabouts or reasons for the 
defendant's absence. When neither court nor counsel 
have information as to why the defendant is not 
present, a continuance will ordinarily be required to 
allow the prosecution and defense counsel an 
opportunity to inquire into the defendant's whereabouts 
and the reasons for his absence. 
[18][19] f 23 Ascertaining whether a defendant's 
absence is voluntary will often be difficult if the 
defendant is simply a no-show. While we need not in 
this case definitively prescribe what the State must do 
to meet its preliminary burden, and while the showing 
it must make will vary with the facts and circumstances 
of particular cases, some avenues for establishing 
voluntariness are: (1) inquiry of law enforcement 
agencies to determine whether the defendant is 
incarcerated, see Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678 ("When a 
defendant is in custody, he is not free to make a 
voluntary decision about whether or not he will attend 
the court proceedings."); (2) inquiry of local hospitals 
as to whether the defendant has been admitted to one of 
them, cf State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982) 
(per curiam) ("Trial proceeded for four days, when on 
the fifth day, defendant failed to appear. He was 
found in a Salt Lake City hospital suffering from a 
heart attack, diagnosed as minor. His doctor contacted 
the court and recommended a one-month 
continuance."); (3) inquiry of the defendant's 
employer, if the employer can be readily determined, as 
to the employer's possible knowledge of the defendant's 
whereabouts; (4) a reasonably diligent attempt to 
contact defendant at his residence or other place 
counsel knows the defendant to frequent; (5) inquiry 
of Pretrial Services or other entity supervising 
defendant's presentence release; and (6) inquiry of any 
bail bond company or other person or entity posting 
bond to secure defendant's appearance. Once inquiry 
appropriate to the case has been made, and a 
compelling reason for the defendant's absence remains 
unknown, voluntariness, while not guarantied, may 
then be properly inferred. 
If 24 Defense counsel, however, must then have the 
opportunity to rebut the inference of voluntariness. 
Defense counsel may by that time have gathered 
additional information regarding the defendant's 
whereabouts and may, for example, be able to contend 
that although no local hospital shows the defendant as 
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currently registered, his roommate says he took him to 
the emergency room the previous evening, suggesting 
the possible involuntariness of the defendant's absence 
at a proceeding early the next morning. 
1f 25 In this case, the State made no preliminary 
showing of voluntariness whatever, and the trial court 
erred by making "inadequate inquiry into [Wanosik's] 
ability to appear *625 on [May 26, 2000] or his 
subsequent availability before deciding that he had 
waived his right to be present at [sentencing]." Houtz, 
714P.2dat678. 
D. Harmless Error 
[20][21] If 26 A trial court's error in failing to conduct 
an adequate inquiry into whether a defendant's absence 
was voluntary does not merit reversal, however, unless 
the defendant was prejudiced by the lack of adequate 
inquiry. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1111-12 (Utah 1996) ("It stands to reason that a 
defendant cannot demand repetition of a trial or 
sentencing in which he suffered no unfairness."). 
When finally apprehended, Wanosik sent a letter to the 
trial court candidly acknowledging: "I do not have a 
legitimate excuse" for not appearing for sentencing. 
Based on Wanosik's subsequent concession of actual 
voluntary absence at sentencing, we conclude that 
Wanosik suffered no prejudice by the trial court's 
failure to make adequate inquiry into whether his 
absence was voluntary. Accordingly, the court's error 
in proceeding to impose sentence was, in this case, 
harmless. 
II. Sentencing Procedure 
f 27 Wanosik argues that, even if proceeding with 
sentencing in his absence was appropriate, "[t]he trial 
court violated due process and Utah R.Crim. P. 22 [ (a) 
] when it sentenced [him] without considering relevant 
and reliable information and without affording defense 
counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to speak at 
sentencing." 
A. Rule 22(a) 
[22] f 28 We first address Wanosik's claim that the 
trial court violated rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. [FN11] The second paragraph of 
rule 22(a) states: 
FN11. The State asserts that Wanosik must 
show plain error with regard to his rule 22(a) 
claim on appeal because he did not preserve 
the claim below. We observe "that rule 22(e) 
[of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] 
permits the court of appeals to consider the 
legality of a sentence even if the issue is 
raised for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). The 
Brooks holding obviates the need for 
appellants to show plain error in asserting on 
appeal unpreserved claims that the sentence 
imposed by the trial court was illegal. See id. 
at 858-60. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, 
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
given an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). Initially, we must determine 
whether Wanosik waived his rights under rule 22(a) by 
voluntarily absenting himself from the sentencing 
proceeding. 
[23][24] t 29 A defendant's personal exercise of the 
rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as allocution. 
See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110-12 (Utah 
1996); State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 
297,299 (1969), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 935, 
92 S.Ct. 2858, 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). "[Allocution] 
is an inseparable part of the right to be present, which 
[a] defendant waive[s] by his voluntary absence." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Wanosik, therefore, by 
his voluntary absence, waived the right to personally 
make a statement at sentencing and to personally 
present information in mitigation of punishment or to 
show legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
See id. 
[25][26][27] | 30 A defendant does not, however, 
altogether waive his rule 22(a) rights through voluntary 
absence at sentencing; he waives only the right to 
personally exercise them. "Sentencing is a critical 
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel," State v. 
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982), and the 
right to effective assistance of counsel cannot be 
waived through voluntary absence alone. See State v. 
Bakalov, 1999UT45,f 16,979 P.2d 799 (holding that, 
in order to waive the right to counsel and "invoke the 
right of self-representation, a defendant must in a 
timely manner ' "clearly and unequivocally" ' request 
[self-representation]" (citations omitted)). 
Furthermore, rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the *626 
sentencing court to "give[ ] [the prosecuting attorney] 
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an opportunity to present any information material to 
the imposition of sentence." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). 
It would be patently unfair, in the case of an absent 
defendant, to hear only from the prosecuting attorney 
and not from defense counsel regarding sentencing 
considerations. Thus, we hold that a sentencing court 
is required to afford a voluntarily absent defendant the 
opportunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through 
counsel. 
f 31 At sentencing in this case, the trial court did hear 
briefly from defense counsel on the issue of Wanosik's 
absence concerning any "legal cause why sentence 
should not [have been] imposed" at that time, Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(a); briefly addressed that issue as 
discussed above; and then proceeded to impose 
sentence. However, before proceeding with sentencing, 
the trial court heard from neither defense counsel nor 
the prosecutor with regard to "information in mitigation 
of punishment" or "any [other] information material to 
the imposition of sentence." Id. The State argues that 
under rule 22(a) the burden rests on counsel to request 
an opportunity to present information relevant to 
sentencing. The State's argument is contrary to the plain 
language of the rule and the construction given it in 
case law. 
| 32 The language of the rule is that "the court shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation 
of punishment." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative 
obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to 
be heard; it does not contemplate the court will 
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be 
heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said 
that rule 22(a) "directs trial courts to hear evidence 
from both the defendant and the prosecution that is 
relevant to the sentence to be imposed." State v. 
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). [FN 12] This 
directive is nowhere made conditional on a preliminary 
request by counsel to present the information. Even if 
a defendant is voluntarily absent, the trial court has the 
duty to set its aggravation aside and impose a 
reasonable sentence, and to that end the court is 
required to hear evidence from both sides relevant to 
sentencing. The onus is thus on the trial court to 
"afford" the defendant and to "give" the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present relevant information. [FN 13] 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). The trial court in this case 
erred by not affording defense counsel an opportunity 
to present information in mitigation of punishment or 
giving the prosecutor an opportunity to present 
information relevant to sentencing. 
FN 12. Howell actually interpreted the 
predecessor of Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(a), Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-22(a 1982). See 707 P.2d at 118. 
Current rule 22(a) differs from then-section 
77-35-22(a) only in that rule 22(a) omits the 
words "in his own behalf from section 
77-35-22(a)'s sentence: "Before imposing 
sentence the court shall afford the defendant 
an opportunity to make a statement in his own 
behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment...." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-22(a) (1982) (emphasis added). See 
also Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). If anything, 
deletion of the italicized phrase emphasizes 
that while defendant is entitled to make a 
statement, he need not personally make it. 
FN 13. We [here] note that it is not just the 
defendant, but the State as well, that has an 
interest in the sentence being based on 
accurate information. Decisions as to the 
type of rehabilitation program, if any, to 
which a defendant is assigned and the 
duration of incarceration both influence the 
allocation of scarce personnel and monetary 
resources. Such decisions should be based 
upon the most reliable data possible as to each 
defendant so that this State may deal with its 
criminal justice program as efficiently as 
possible. 
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 
1982). 
[28] ^ 33 Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this case 
was not harmless, as the State suggests. Had either 
defense counsel or the prosecutor been given a chance 
to address AP & P's recommendation that Wanosik be 
sentenced to 20 days in jail with credit for time served 
and that he then be committed to a substance abuse 
treatment program, the sentencing outcome for 
Wanosik may well have been more favorable than the 
maximum sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus, 
we vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for 
resentencing. 
*627 B. Due Process Requirements at Sentencing 
[29][30][31][32] f 34 Due Process considerations 
underscore the propriety of our remand for 
resentencing. "The due process clause of Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a 
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
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relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing 
a sentence." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1985). "A sentence in a criminal case should be 
appropriate for the defendant in light of his background 
and the crime committed and also serve the interests of 
society which underlie the criminal justice system." 
State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). 
"[T]he sentencing judge[ ][has] discretion in 
determining what punishment fits both the crime and 
the offender," but we have consistently sought "to 
shore up the soundness and reliability of the factual 
basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of 
that sentencing discretion." State v.. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of 
presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing). 
Although rule 22(a) implements sound procedures 
aimed at insuring that the trial court bases its 
sentencing decision on such information, a criminal 
defendant's right to be sentenced based on relevant and 
reliable information regarding his crime, his 
background, and the interests of society stands 
independent of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). 
1f 35 The record in this case fails to disclose any 
relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that 
defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by 
the trial court in imposing maximum-albeit 
concurrent-sentences for both crimes. Voluntary 
absence from sentencing may properly serve as one 
factor in determining an appropriate sentence, as it is 
an indirect-but telling-indication of the defendant's 
suitability for probation or susceptibility to 
rehabilitative efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to 
rely upon that fact alone in deciding what sentence to 
impose, nor may such absence be punished by 
imposing a sentence more severe than is otherwise 
warranted. From all that appears in the record, 
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the only 
information considered by the trial court in deciding 
what sentences to impose. 
% 36 Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised 
by the trial court's failure to base its sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliable information regarding 
the crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of 
society. For the same reasons noted in the preceding 
section, the trial court's failure to base its sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliable information was not 
harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
1f 37 A defendant informed of the time and place for 
sentencing need not be further informed that sentencing 
may proceed in the defendant's voluntary absence. 
Furthermore, a sentencing court need not balance 
society's interest in proceeding against a voluntarily 
absent defendant with the defendant's interest in being 
present before proceeding with sentencing in absentia. 
In this case, the trial court's only error in regard to 
proceeding in absentia was its inadequate inquiry into 
the actual voluntariness of Wanosik's absence. The 
error was, however, harmless given Wanosik's later 
concession that his absence was indeed voluntary. 
1J38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in not complying 
with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) by failing 
to afford defendant, through his counsel, an 
opportunity to present information in mitigation of 
punishment and by failing to also give the prosecutor 
an opportunity to present information relevant to 
sentencing. This course was also at odds with 
Wanosik's Due Process rights, as the court failed to 
base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information. 
U 39 We vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for 
resentencing. 
H 40 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Associate Presiding Judge, WILLIAM A. THORNE, 
Jr., Judge. 
31 P.3d 615, 428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT App 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or pica of no contest., the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. Tf a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the c urt. 
ie) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77. Chapter 16a Utah ('ode. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Sendees as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202( 1Kb), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec* 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 26, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: Your Honor, my last matter before you is 
4 Anthony James Wanosik, and I've looked for him but I've not 
5 been able to find himf your Honor. He did obtain his pre-
6 sentence report. 
7 THE COURT: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom? 
8 (No response) 
9 THE COURT: Yes, let's discuss that matter for a 
10 moment. This is case No. CR00-5943. Ms. Garland, you're 
11 appearing in his behalf? 
12 MS. GARLAND: I am, your Honor. I think given that he 
13 did go and obtain his pre-sentence report he was intending to 
14 show up today, and so I would ask that you hold on to any 
15 warrants and give me a chance to find him. I believe he may 
16 have simply written down the wrong date. 
17 THE COURT: Well— 
18 MS. GARLAND: I believe that, Judge, because this is a 
19 fairly favorable pre-sentence report, so he would have had no 
20 reason to try and avoid court today, it would— 
21 THE COURT: Presumably. 
22 MS. GARLAND: Yes, it would have been in his best 
23 interest to appear. 
24 THE COURT: I think in the meantime, counsel, given 
25 his failure to appear I will terminate his pre-trial release, 
-3-
1 issue a warrant for his arrest returnable forthwith no bail. 
2 My inclination is to sentence him today, and I recognize you 
3 would prefer that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is 
4 curious that he has failed to appear today, although I can only 
5 assume because he has not been in touch with you nor has he 
6 been in touch with my court that he has chosen to voluntarily 
7 absent himself from these proceedings. 
8 Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this 
9 Court that he serve the term provided by law in the adult 
10 detention center of one year for the class A misdemeanor crime 
11 of attempted possession of a controlled substance, and six 
12 months for the possession of a controlled substance, a 
13 misdemeanor charge to which he has pled guilty. I will order 
14 that those terms be served concurrently and not consecutively, 
15 and that they be imposed forthwith. 
16 Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or 
17 shows up before he's arrested, then you may approach me, but in 
18 the meantime, Mr. D'alesandro, you prepare the findings of fact 
19 conclusions of law and order determining voluntary absent 
20 compliance, and that will be the order. 
21 MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that order 
22 because I don't think that it takes into account his due 
23 process rights or his rights about— 
24 THE COURT: Right. 
25 MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your order. 
-4-
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant him 
credit for the eight days he served originally awaiting 
imposition or a resolution. 
MS. GARLAND: All right. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Appellant Jon Donald Hamling appeals his 
sentence imposed in absentia. Hamling pleaded guilty 
to attempted possession of a controlled substance, a 
class A misdemeanor. At the time of his plea, he was 
given a sentencing hearing date of August 4,2001, and 
told to contact Adult Probation and Parole for the 
preparation of a presentence report. Hamling was also 
ordered released pending sentencing. Hamling 
participated in the preparation of the presentence report 
and provided information to Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Hamling did not appear at his sentencing hearing. 
Defense counsel indicated that she had had contact 
with him two weeks prior to the sentencing date, but 
not since then. The court determined that, because 
Hamling had not contacted the court and he was not at 
the sentencing hearing, he had voluntarily absented 
himself from the proceedings. The judge gave defense 
counsel an opportunity to provide sentencing 
information. Counsel spoke on Hamling's behalf and 
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the judge then, without affording the prosecution an 
opportunity to address sentencing, imposed a sentence 
of one year of incarceration, the maximum penalty for 
a class A misdemeanor. Defense counsel filed a motion 
to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court, which 
was denied, and this appeal followed. 
In sentencing Hamling in absentia, the prosecution 
bears the burden of making a preliminary showing, 
based on reasonable inquiry, that defendant's absence 
is voluntary. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, K 22, 
428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Only after inquiry, the court, 
in appropriate circumstances, may infer that the 
defendant's absence is voluntary. Id. at \ 23. Defense 
counsel must "then have the opportunity to rebut the 
inference of voluntariness." Id. at \ 24. The court did 
not require any evidence from the State and inferred 
Hamling was voluntarily absent based solely on the fact 
that the defendant was not present and none of the 
parties had contact with him within two weeks prior to 
sentencing. 
When neither the court nor counsel have information 
as to why the defendant is absent, the court should 
grant a continuance to allow reasonable inquiry into his 
nonappearance. Id. at f 22. This court, in Wanosik, set 
forth some factors the court may consider in 
determining whether an absence is voluntary. Id. at f 
23. 
Upon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with 
the procedure set forth in Wanosik. Id. at f 38. Such 
procedure includes giving both the defense and the 
prosecution the opportunity to make a statement prior 
to sentencing 
Lastly, the State argues that post-sentencing trial court 
docket entries, made after the defendant was 
subsequently arrested, reflect no good reason why the 
defendant failed to appear at his sentencing. These later 
developments have no bearing on whether the 
defendant was sentenced lawfully as post-sentencing 
information was not considered in the court's 
determination of voluntariness. 
*2 We vacate Hamling's sentence and remand for 
resentencing in accordance with State v. Wanosik. 
2001 WL 1055702 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 267 
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